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Bank institutional setting and risk-taking: The missing role of directors’ education and 
turnover
ABSTRACT
Purpose
This paper aims to analyze the relationship between bank institutional setting and risk-taking by exploring 
whether board education and turnover are drivers of the risk propensity of cooperative banks compared to joint-
stock banks.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on a comprehensive dataset of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period, we examine whether these board 
characteristics affect the risk propensity of cooperative and joint-stock banks. Bank risk is measured by the Z-
index, profit volatility and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans.
Findings
The findings show that cooperatives take less risk than joint-stock banks and have lower board turnover and 
education. Furthermore, we find that while board education mediates the relationship between the cooperative 
model and bank risk-taking, we do not find evidence of board turnover. Thus, the lower educational level of 
cooperative directors contributes to explaining the lower risk-taking of cooperative banks.
Implications
The findings have several implications. In terms of the more general policy debate, our results point to the need 
to strengthen the governance model for both joint-stock and cooperative banks while supporting the view that a 
more ad hoc perspective on the best models and practices for each type of institutional setting would be 
preferable. In particular, the study reveals how board education’s effects on bank risk-taking should be carefully 
monitored.
Originality/value
Through a mediation framework, this study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between bank 
institutional setting (by distinguishing between cooperative and joint-stock banks) and risk-taking behavior by 
exploring the underlying mechanisms at the board level, which is novel in the literature.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Cooperative Banks, Bank Ownership, Board of Directors, Bank Risk.
1. Introduction
In the years before the financial crisis, bank risk came under greater scrutiny by regulators, reinvigorating the 
debate among policy makers and academics regarding best practices in bank risk management and governance. 
In the banking industry, a crucial role in managing the relationship between risk and governance is assigned to 
the board of directors. As stated in the corporate governance principles for banks introduced by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), “The board is responsible for overseeing a strong risk governance 
framework, including review of key policies and controls, and should be active when it comes to defining the 
risk appetite and ensuring alignment thereof within the bank. It should ensure the efficacy of the risk 
management, compliance and internal audit functions”. Since the Basel Committee introduced the prudential 
capital framework in 1988, the literature on this topic has grown rapidly and in different directions (Anderson & 
Fraser, 2000; J. H. Boyd & De Nicoló, 2005; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, & Saurina, 2014; Saunders, Strock, & 
Travlos, 1990). More recently, the literature has emphasized the critical role of good corporate governance in 
banking and revealed how existing regulatory failures could severely impair the stability of the financial system. 
To reduce those loopholes revealed by the 2007-2008 crisis, regulators at the global level have revised their 
corporate governance standards in areas related to the board of directors and management compensation. The 
responses of banks to these initiatives have differed. The most divergence in these reactions is evident between 
joint-stock banks and cooperative banks. Joint-stock banks and their governance were at the center of the 
financial crisis, and they are therefore more willing to comply with new standards, whereas cooperative banks 
argued that they performed better in terms of having lower volatility and more stable returns, as they took less 
risk during the crisis than joint-stock banks did because of their specific corporate governance characteristics 
(European Association of Cooperative Banks [EACB], 2015).
While numerous explanations have been invoked for why cooperative banks take less risk, e.g., business 
model characteristics and ownership structure, to the best of our knowledge, no studies to date have directly 
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related this difference to bank governance and specifically to board characteristics (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; 
Fonteyne, 2007; Groeneveld & de Vries, 2009; Hansmann, 2000). By the same token, studies on bank 
governance and risk-taking have thus far neglected the implications of different institutional settings. Therefore, 
it is relevant from an academic and policy perspective to explore in greater depth the different roles played by 
boards of directors in the risk-taking of cooperative banks (Kumar & Zattoni, 2018). To contribute to filling this 
gap, we add a new dimension to the literature by enhancing the understanding of how board characteristics 
differently affect the risk-taking of these two types of institutional settings. In line with more recent studies 
(Baran & Forst, 2015; Pevzner, Xie, & Xin, 2015), we examine this issue using a mediation framework that 
allows us to investigate the interplay between risk-taking – our outcome variable - and ownership status via the 
inclusion of a third variable (mediator variable) related to board characteristics. 
The empirical literature has mainly analyzed the impact of board structure (in terms of size, gender 
composition, etc.), directors’ independence and compensation packages on firm/bank outcomes (Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Mehran, Morrison, & Shapiro, 2012; Pathan, 2009; Vallascas, 
Mollah, & Keasey, 2017); to date, the impact of board education and turnover remain less studied (Berger, Kick, 
& Schaeck, 2014; Minton, Taillard, & Williamson, 2014). These two dimensions, however, play a crucial role in 
the difference between the governance of joint-stock banks and cooperative banks because of the institutional 
setting. Therefore, our analysis aims to empirically test whether board education and turnover play a role in 
explaining the difference between joint-stock and cooperative banks in terms of risk-taking after controlling for 
other identified drivers of risk-taking and other governance characteristics.
To test our hypotheses, we apply a dynamic panel approach to hand-collected data for a comprehensive sample 
of 638 Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period. Descriptive analyses reveal a relatively high number of bank 
directors with low levels of education (proxied by the holding of at least a university degree) in the Italian 
banking industry (only 39% of board members hold a university degree), especially among cooperative banks 
(only 23% of cooperative directors hold a university degree). Moreover, we find that cooperatives take less risk 
than joint-stock banks and that their boards have lower turnover and lower education levels. The mediation 
analyses reveal that board education mediates the relationship between banks’ institutional setting and bank risk, 
which indicates that cooperative banks take less risk than joint-stock banks because directors of cooperatives are 
less educated than directors of joint-stock banks. This finding supports the view that less-educated directors tend 
to assume less risk (Beber & Fabbri, 2012), which leads cooperative banks to be more stable. Notably, our 
results are valid only for measures of total risk (Z-index and standard deviation of ROA) but not for our proxy 
of credit risk. Extending the analysis, we test an alternative explanation of credit risk-taking determinants, and 
we find that small cooperative banks assume less credit risk than large ones. This result suggests that small 
cooperative banks operating in localized areas have a closer relationship with their customers, so that directors’ 
level of education is probably less relevant than the soft information acquired on the borrowers and the peer 
monitoring mechanisms. In contrast, our estimations do not support the hypothesis regarding the mediating role 
of board turnover on the relationship between the bank institutional setting and bank risk.
At the industry level, our investigation aims to add new evidence to the active debate in Europe regarding 
how institutional differences should be reflected in ad hoc banking regulation and corporate governance 
standards (European Association of Co-operative Banks, 2015). This debate began soon after the recent 
financial crisis, as cooperative banks stressed their ability to master the crisis (higher resilience) much better 
than other banking groups. Write-offs by European cooperative banks (cooperative banks represent 20% of the 
European banking services market) amounted only to 7% of the write-offs of the whole banking system after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis. The cooperative banking industry claimed that this outcome was “due to their 
prudence in dealing with risks and the cooperative ownership and governance model that keep them close to 
their members and customers” (European Association of Co-operative Banks, 2012).
From an academic perspective, however, this view contrasts with agency theory, which predicts that the 
weaknesses associated with cooperative banks’ ownership structure and the ambiguity of their objectives will 
lead to poor governance (Borgen, 2004; Hart & Moore, 1998). Our results contribute to both the academic and 
industry debates showing that one of the weaknesses of their model – the lower level of education of the 
directors – helps to explain the lower level of risk of cooperatives and thus their better performance in the recent 
financial crisis.
In terms of the more general policy debate, our results overall point to the need to strengthen the governance 
model for both joint-stock and cooperative banks while supporting the view that a more ad hoc perspective of 
the best models and practices for each type of institutional setting would be recommended. Regarding the more 
specific discussion on the level of expertise and education that should be required to become a director of a bank 
board, our evidence points to a positive role of a low education level on risk-taking. We are not suggesting that 
less-educated boards are a desirable feature of banks’ boards. In this respect, our evidence is able to highlight 
only that the weakness of the cooperative bank governance model remains an issue even in light of their 
stronger resilience during the crisis. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
specifies our testable hypotheses and discusses the related literature. Section III describes our empirical design 
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and related methodological issues, and Sections IV and V discuss our results and our robustness checks. The last 
section discusses policy implications and concludes the paper.
2. An overview of the Italian banking system
Italy is a bank-oriented system in which banks are the key providers of loans to non-financial companies and the 
main collector of household savings. On the one hand, credit provided by banks is almost of 166 percent of 
Italy’s GDP, which is relatively higher compared to Germany (127 percent) and France (157 percent). On the 
other hand, Italian banks have deposits amounting to almost 69 percent of total liabilities, which is higher than 
the levels for French (54 percent) and German banks (62 percent). Overall, banks account for almost 85 percent 
of Italy’s financial sector, and their total assets represent approximately 220 percent of Italian GDP.
In particular, the Italian banking system is composed of a few large banking groups that operate nationally and 
internationally and a large number of small banks that operate locally, mainly in the form of cooperative banks. 
Specifically, the Italian banking system consists of approximately 540 banks with approximately 27,400 
branches distributed throughout the country (Bank of Italy, 2018). As a consequence, the Italian banking system 
is not very concentrated. Table 1 presents the number of banks and their branches, classified by bank 
institutional setting.
Insert Table 1 about here 
In Italy, banks adopt two main institutional settings. On the one hand, joint-stock banks are established as joint-
stock companies. They pursue the goal of maximizing shareholder value and can be listed on stock exchanges. 
Shareholders are the bank’s owners and residual claimants. On the other hand, Italy has a large and well-
developed system of cooperative banks (Becchetti, Garcia, & Trovato, 2011; Bofondi & Gobbi, 2006; Fiordelisi 
& Mare, 2013; Giagnocavo, Gerez, & Sforzi, 2012). In cooperative banks depositors, borrowers and owners 
usually overlap. Generally, cooperative banks can operate only in a limited area and prevailingly with their 
members. Thus, cooperatives satisfy the needs of their members, owners, customers and/or employees at the 
same time. From this perspective, profitability is not the main objective of such banks. The cooperative 
objective is less clearly defined, as the cooperative business model is motivated not by profit maximization but 
rather by a combination of economic and social goals.
Regarding owner rights, the cooperative model has vaguely defined ownership rights (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). 
Indeed, members retain one vote per capita, irrespective of the subscribed capital. New members are equivalent 
to existing members in terms of the votes they can express at the general annual meeting. There are limits 
regarding the amount of shares that owners may possess and the profit distribution: profits are set aside as a 
reserve. As a consequence, these limitations on ownership rights make it difficult to list a cooperative in a stock 
market (Hart and Moore, 1998). Finally, under a governance profile, it should be noted that cooperatives are 
generally self-administered such that cooperative members usually elect the board members from amongst the 
membership (Shaw, 2006).
The cooperative form is the most widespread legal status among Italian banks, and cooperative banks are 
particularly strong in localized areas. Almost 60 percent of Italian banks adopt the status of cooperative banks 
(including the Italian Banche di Credito Cooperativo – BCCs – and the Italian Banche Popolari Cooperative –
BPs), and joint-stock banks constitute the remainder (Statistical Database of the Bank of Italy, 2018). Italian 
cooperative banks are similar in their objectives and main features to most cooperative banks in Europe, as they 
are also part of the European Association of Co-operative Banks.
In Italy, cooperative status is adopted by Italian BCCs (Art. 28 Legislative Decree no. 385/1993) and by 
Italian BPs. Even if BCCs and BPs are similar with regard to the voting rights of their members who are entitled 
to the “one person, one vote” principle, these banks actually differ in several respects (Jassaud, 2014). BCCs 
function in a well-defined geographical area and serve mainly their members, who typically must reside or 
permanently work in the area in which the bank operates. To found such banks, the law sets a minimum of 200 
members (Art. 30 and 34 Legislative Decree no. 385/1993). The entry of new members is approved by the 
bank’s board of directors (Article 30 Legislative Decree no. 385/1993), which may also refuse admission. 
Members cannot hold equity shares for amounts in excess of €50,000. According to the standard statute of 
cooperative banks approved by the Bank of Italy, cooperative members cannot transfer their shares to non-
members without the approval of the board. Moreover, BCCs must retain almost 70 percent of their annual 
profit as a reserve. In addition, BCC directors are elected from among cooperative members. Unlike BCCs, BPs 
can operate with non-members and do not have geographical limitations. The net profits of BPs can be 
distributed to members except for a quota of at least 10 percent allocated to the legal reserve. Finally, unlike 
BCCs, the shares of BPs can be publicly traded. Although BPs are a hybrid of joint-stock banks and BCCs, they 
are closer to the former than to the latter in terms of operational characteristics. In fact, BPs are large banks 
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operating on a broad (national/international) scale that offer a wide range, even a sophisticated range, of 
financial services (Tarantola, 2009).
3. Related literature and hypotheses development
3.1 Risk propensity and bank institutional settings
The literature highlights that cooperative banks have, on average, less incentive to take on more risk than 
joint-stock banks. Hansmann (2000) emphasizes that during the US savings and loan crisis, investor-owned 
banks took on more speculative investment than mutual savings and loan associations. Based on a sample of 
16,577 banks from 29 OECD countries over the 1994-2004 period, Hesse & Čihák (2007) find that cooperative 
banks are more stable, given that they have, on average, a higher Z-index and lower profit volatility than 
commercial banks. Studies of a number of EU countries reveal the same results. García-Marco & Robles-
Fernández (2008) analyze a sample of Spanish banks over the 1993-2000 period and find that cooperative banks 
take on less risk than commercial banks. Beck, Hesse, Kick, & von Westernhagen (2009) show that cooperative 
and savings banks in Germany are more stable than private banks. Finally, Köhler (2015) analyzes the impact of 
business models on bank stability in 15 EU countries between 2002 and 2011 and finds that savings and 
cooperative banks are more stable than investment banks, which typically take the form of joint-stock 
companies. These findings are consistent with the pivotal role of cooperative banks, which is to provide loans to 
its members, such that profit maximization objectives are tempered by the broader goal of maximizing the 
general interests of their members and the community over the long run (Fonteyne, 2007). Furthermore, the 
characteristics of cooperative ownership structure and the superior abilities of cooperative banks in handling 
customers’ information could contribute to explaining these findings (Borgen, 2004; Chaddad & Cook, 2004; 
Hart & Moore, 1998, Fiordelisi & Mare, 2013; Groeneveld & de Vries, 2009; Hesse & Čihák, 2007).
While these theoretical arguments attempt to explain the negative relation between a cooperative 
institutional setting and risk-taking behavior, no studies empirically investigate the potential drivers of this 
relationship. Moreover, the role of the board of directors is completely neglected. However, the board of 
directors is the body that makes decisions concerning business opportunities, approves bank strategies and, 
therefore, determines how much risk the bank can take. Therefore, we analyze the risk propensity of cooperative 
and joint-stock banks by focusing on the underlying mechanisms at the board level. Empirical studies have 
widely analyzed the impact of board structure (in terms of size, gender composition, etc.), directors’ 
independence and compensation packages on firm/bank outcomes, but less attention has been paid to board 
education and turnover. However, corporate governance standards stress the importance of hiring directors with 
strong knowledge and the competences necessary to grasp the complexity of banking business and, thus, the 
associated risks. Scholars highlight that more (and better) educated directors are expected to deal better (at lower 
cost) with these complexities and risks and thus to make better decisions (Harris & Raviv, 2008). While 
education and financial expertise are not enough to ensure that the board effectively assesses risk-taking, it is an 
important pre-requisite (Mehran et al., 2012). Moreover, while governance standards highlight the risks 
associated with low board turnover because it implies a higher likelihood of entrenchment problems and thus 
lowers directors’ ability to monitor managers (Boubakri, Dionne, & Triki, 2008), board turnover is also 
considered beneficial for organizations in responding to and managing environmental threats and uncertainty 
(Jiang & Peng, 2011; Young, Buchholtz, & Ahlstrom, 2003). Based on this literature, our conceptual model 
proposes that board education and turnover are explanatory factors of the relationship between institutional 
setting and bank risk-taking (Figure 1). The extent to which the bank institutional setting affects bank risk-
taking and whether this relationship is explained by board education and turnover constitute our empirical 
question.
Insert Figure 1 about here
3.2 Board education, turnover and cooperative bank risk-taking
In the agency perspective, the board of directors has a key role in monitoring managers to prevent them from 
pursuing their own interests over those of the owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In the banking sector, the role of 
the board is even more critical than it is in other industries. The banking business is complex and therefore 
nontransparent to a wide audience of stakeholders (shareholders, creditors, debtors, regulators, etc.). Thus, 
boards of directors have a key role in bank governance because they not only monitor management but also 
provide guidance and advice to managers (de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 
2011).
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Given the predictions of agency theory and the characteristics of the cooperative model, we argue that the legal 
status of a cooperative could impact board characteristics in terms of education and turnover.
Cooperatives are characterized by weak ownership rights that increase free-riding problems in monitoring 
activities (Borgen, 2004; Hart & Moore, 1998; Vitaliano, 1983). Furthermore, cooperative objectives are opaque 
and less clearly defined because of the ambiguous role of cooperative owners, who are simultaneously 
customers (depositors and/or borrowers) and employees. In this situation, the board cannot effectively perform 
its tasks (monitoring, advice, strategic, etc.) because of a lack of clear performance measures. As a result, the 
literature suggests that the board tends to operate in ways that reflect individual board members’ professional or 
personal competencies despite cooperative members’ preferences (Miller, 2002). Therefore, board members’ 
competencies are crucial to effectively manage cooperatives.
Regarding the competence levels of cooperative board members, the literature highlights that in cooperative 
organizations, the idea of non-professional boards is central, and therefore, anyone can be elected as a board 
member. The institutional setting of cooperatives is widely influenced by a democratic perspective (Cornforth & 
Edwards, 1999; Cornforth, 2004; Hung, 1998). The key ideas of the democratic perspective include open 
elections with a “one person, one vote” mechanism; representatives for different constituencies or interests; 
accountability to the electorate; and self-administration, as cooperative members typically elect the board of 
directors from among their membership (Davis, 2001; Shaw, 2006). Therefore, from a democratic perspective, 
the board has the task of representing the interests of the organization’s members regardless of the board 
members’ competence level.
Consequently, expertise may be desirable but not essential, as it is in corporations. Therefore, clear gaps may 
remain in the collective skills and experience required for an effective board. In sum, while stewardship theory 
suggests that board members should be selected for their professional expertise and skills, the democratic 
perspective (and, to some extent, stakeholder theory) highlights that board members are lay representatives and 
that they serve the stakeholders they represent. As a consequence, compared to the directors of corporations, 
cooperative directors do not always have high educational qualifications or professional experience in the field 
(Allemand, Brullebaut, & Raimbault, 2013; Cornforth, 2004; Hardesty, 2005; Keeling, 2004; Servin, Lensink, 
& van den Berg, 2012; Shaw, 2006; Vitaliano, 1983). Cooperative members are usually ordinary citizens, 
professionals, craftsmen, traders, farmers or retirees. Analyzing a sample of Italian cooperative banks, Schwizer 
& Stefanelli (2011) show that, on average, 46% of the directors are entrepreneurs, farmers and artisans, 23% are 
professionals (accountants, lawyers, etc.), 17% are retirees and 15% represent other categories (civil servants, 
doctors and unemployed). Furthermore, 18% of the directors have only a graduation certificate from middle 
school, 52% have a high school diploma, and only 30% have a university degree. In their survey, Alexopoulos, 
Catturani, & Goglio (2013) obtain similar results.
Given these theoretical and empirical arguments, cooperative banks will have a low level of board education 
compared to joint-stock banks.
However, scholars recognize that educational background is a demographic characteristic of top 
management that affects managerial behavior and firm performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Educational 
degrees are considered proxies for knowledge base or intelligence, and it is expected that managers with higher 
educational degrees should be better equipped to process complex information, respond to change and innovate. 
In particular, Bantel & Jackson (1989) analyze the relationship between top management characteristics and 
innovation in banking and find that top managers’ education is positively related to a greater propensity to 
engage in innovative projects. Other studies show that well-educated top management is associated with a 
higher probability of changes in firm strategy, such as in the direction of a more internationally diversified 
portfolio (Herrmann & Datta, 2005; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Finally, scholars suggest that high educational 
levels lead to more open-mindedness, a higher likelihood of undertaking change, innovation and a greater ability 
to process information (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wincent, Anokhin, & Örtqvist, 2010). With regard to the 
relationship between education and risk-taking, the empirical literature has found conflicting evidence (Berger 
et al., 2014) but is in favor of the notion that higher education is positively associated to more aggressive 
strategic choices and, thus, with risk-taking propensities because education breeds overconfidence and greater 
tolerance to risk (Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Frank & Goyal, 
2007). Moreover, low education leads to a focus on traditional business, which is better known. Among others, 
Bertrand & Schoar (2003) show that firms whose managers have an MBA appear to follow more aggressive 
strategies and run more-leveraged companies.
Therefore, we argue that board education functions as a mediating variable that transmits the effect of a 
cooperative institutional setting to bank risk-taking. Our idea suggests that the lower level of director education 
in cooperative banks can contribute to explaining their lower risk-taking despite cooperative members’ risk 
preference. Our hypothesis is thus as follows:
Hp 1: Board education mediates the relationship between bank institutional setting and bank risk. In particular, 
cooperative status leads to low levels of director education, which in turn leads to low levels of bank risk.
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In agency theory, the turnover of board members or top managers is a key mechanism that exerts pressure on 
these actors to act in the interests of shareholders. In fact, shareholders can threaten dismissal if board members 
and/or top management do not act in their interests (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Kaplan, 1994). From the 
resource dependence perspective, while excessive turnover could be detrimental because it will reduce the 
presence of firm-specific knowledge on the board (Forbes & Milliken, 2008), it is recognized that a moderate 
level of board turnover may be beneficial for the organization. A stream of research has shown that the board of 
directors is a particular change mechanism by which firms can respond to and manage environmental threats 
and uncertainties (Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988; Krivogorsky & Eichenseher, 2005; Mizruchi & Stearns, 
1988). Through directors’ selection and turnover, the views and interests of important internal and external 
stakeholders are reflected in board composition and can promote strategic and organizational change in order to 
challenge and better respond to changes in the environment. Therefore, board turnover can be beneficial for a 
well-functioning board to incorporate new ideas into strategic decisions and ensure that the board composition is 
in line with the environment and needs of the firm (Jiang & Peng, 2011; Young et al., 2003).
However, the replacement mechanism in cooperative banks is not as effective as it is in joint-stock banks for 
a number of reasons: i) because of their dispersed ownership and the one vote per capita principle, individual 
members have less interest in and less incentive to spend resources to monitor and control directors, preferring 
to free-ride instead; ii) because shareholders are both members and customers at the same time, they may be 
more interested in obtaining loans on good terms than in controlling directors; and iii) because cooperative 
banks’ shares are not listed and because they typically face low levels of competition in the local area in which 
they operate, they are less likely to face scrutiny by sophisticated shareholders (Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999; Hart 
& Moore, 1998). Thus, cooperative di ectors are subject to lower external controls.
Consequently, the literature suggests that board members in cooperative banks can become a ‘self-
perpetuating autocracy’ (Nicols, 1967) – particularly when compared to joint-stock banks – and that 
cooperatives have less board turnover (Battistin, Graziano, & Parigi, 2012; Stefancic, 2014). This finding 
implies that cooperative directors might remain in their posts for long periods, even when they are ineffective, as 
they are insulated and protected from many internal and external pressures (Spear, 2004). Given these 
theoretical explanations, we expect that the cooperative model has lower director turnover. In this situation, 
board members will become powerful and entrenched so that they can exploit cooperative resources to pursue 
their own advantage, including protecting their position. On the other hand, they are incentivized to prefer a 
“quiet life” and to avoid organizational change or innovative and risky projects that may affect their current 
positions and future benefits (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). These incentives are even stronger when 
directors are also investors in (customers of) the bank (Konishi & Yasuda, 2004).
Therefore, we test the hypothesis that director turnover mediates the relationship between the bank 
institutional setting and bank risk-taking. Our hypothesis is formulated as follows:
Hp 2: Board turnover mediates the relationship between bank institutional setting and bank risk. In 
particular, cooperative status leads to low board turnover, which, in turn leads to low bank risk.
4. Research design: sample, variable and estimation framework
4.1 Sample and data collection
Our hypotheses were tested on the population of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period. We retrieved the 
population of banks operating in Italy from the statistical information system of the Bank of Italy. In particular, 
we focus on joint-stock and cooperative banks (Italian BCCs). We excluded branches of foreign banks. Data 
collection was performed from different databases. We used the statistical information system database of the 
Bank of Italy to collect demographic information (bank name, location, age, etc.) for the sampled banks and 
information about banks that acquired other banks during the period. As for information on bank board 
characteristics, we hand-collected these data from bank websites, governance reports and financial statements. 
We further checked this information with reference to Associazione Bancaria Italiana (ABI) Yearbooks. The 
ABI Yearbook is published annually and reports information on the governing bodies (size, gender, etc.) of each 
Italian bank. Finally, we collected bank balance sheet data from the Bankscope database.
Overall, we identified 766 banks that operated in the 2011-2017 period. Banks that began their business after 
2011 and banks that closed down before 2017 were included in this group. We kept only those banks with 
information available for at least two consecutive years (Pathan, 2009). We excluded 89 banks due to missing 
information. Moreover, we excluded all annual observations related to banks that were affected by special 
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measures taken by the supervisory authority (special administration, interim management, etc.) because of non-
comparability issues in financial data and in board composition1. We initially excluded BPs from the analysis 
because of their hybrid institutional setting. Moreover, there are only 39 BPs (i.e., 5 percent of our sample), with 
241 year observations. In the section on robustness checks, we report estimates including BPs.
The final sample comprises 638 banks, consisting of 198 joint-stock banks and 440 cooperative banks. Our data 
gathering resulted in an unbalanced panel of 4,176 observations.
4.2 The dependent variable – bank risk
We proxy bank risk using a number of measures that are used extensively in the banking literature. First, we use 
the Z-index (De Nicoló, Jalal, & Boyd, 2006; Laeven & Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009), which is calculated as the 
sum of the equity-asset ratio (or capital-asset ratio; CAR) and return on assets (ROA) divided by an estimation 
of the ROA’s standard deviation. A higher Z-index indicates that a bank is less risky and thus more solvent. This 
measure provides the number of standard deviations that the ROA must decrease before equity capital is 
depleted and the bank is consequently insolvent. We calculate the Z-index as follows:
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖,𝑡
where ROAi,t and CARi,t are the return on assets and the equity-asset ratio, respectively, of bank i during the 
period t, calculated at the end of the fiscal year. ROA is calculated as the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets. To 
compute the σ(ROA)i,t of bank i in period t, we used data from two periods (t, t – 1) to capture the short-term 
fluctuations of bank risk (Delis, Hasan, & Tsionas, 2014; Delis & Staikouras, 2011). Using data from three 
periods (t, t – 1 and t – 2), the results remain unchanged. Finally, to address the skewness of the Z-index, we 
take its natural logarithm.
Next to this ratio, we use a proxy for banks’ ex post credit risk-taking – the non-performing loan (NPL) score – 
which is defined as the ratio between non-performing loans and gross loans measured at the end of the fiscal 
year. This score provides information on the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. This score is not fully 
comparable with the Z-index, as it focuses only on lending banks’ traditional core activity. Lending remains the 
predominant activity in smaller and more traditional banks (such as cooperative banks) but is less fundamental 
in well-diversified banks, such as joint-stock banks. As expected, the Z-index and NPL score are negatively 
correlated: higher credit risk increases ROA volatility, which in turn leads to a low level of bank solvency. 
Finally, in line with the recent literature, we also test our hypotheses using the standard deviation of profit, i.e., 
σ(ROA)i,t, as the dependent variable (Delis & Staikouras, 2009; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014).
4.3 Key independent and control variables
To test our hypotheses related to the relationship between bank risk-taking and bank institutional setting, the 
independent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 for cooperative banks and 0 otherwise. Joint-stock banks 
are the baseline category. To avoid spurious relations between the dependent and independent variables, we 
control for bank and board characteristics that may affect bank risk-taking. Regarding bank-level variables, it is 
generally acknowledged that bank risk is influenced by firm characteristics. Therefore, we control for bank size, 
bank age, the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model (Andres & Vallelado, 2008) 
and bank growth, measured as the growth rate of bank assets. We measure bank size as the natural log of banks’ 
total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Bank age is the natural log of a bank’s age. The asset growth rate is the 
year-on-year percentage change in banks’ total assets.
Furthermore, we consider a dummy variable for listed banks that equals 1 if bank i is listed on a stock market 
during period t and 0 otherwise. Listed companies are subject to greater scrutiny from stock markets and 
regulatory authorities (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010) and are thus expected to manage their risk more closely. 
Moreover, we include the following control variables in the model with the Z-index and σ(ROA) as the 
dependent variables: i) a variable to control for an abnormal level of NPL, measured as a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the NPL score of bank i in year t is higher than the 90th percentile, and 0 otherwise; ii) a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if bank i completed an acquisition in time t, and 0 otherwise.
On the board level, we consider the following control variables that might affect bank risk-taking.
Board size. This variable is expressed as its natural log. The literature highlights the relationship between board 
size and firm risk-taking. In particular, scholars suggest that small board size is positively related to firm risk-
taking, as a smaller board leads to a closer alignment with shareholder interests, which in turn increases 
company risk-taking (Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985; Minton et al., 2014; Nakano & Nguyen, 2012; 
Pathan, 2009).
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Gender diversity. This variable is expressed as the proportion of female directors on the board. Gender 
diversity is a demographic characteristic that influences risk-taking. In the banking literature, scholars highlight 
that women are more risk averse than their male counterparts (Beck, Behr, & Guettler, 2013; Bellucci, Borisov, 
& Zazzaro, 2010; Berger et al., 2014; Palvia, Vähämaa, & Vähämaa, 2014).
Board turnover. Following Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach, & Wosinska (2004), board turnover is calculated 
as
)1at sizeBoard(2
)1andbetween boardleft the that directorsof(N.)at directorsnew(N.of


t
t-tt
Scholars note that replacing directors is a means of persuading them to do their job better (Franks, Mayer, & 
Renneboog, 2001; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan, 1994). In addition, board turnover is a proxy for 
entrenchment risk (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001).
Board education. Ideally, the proxy for board education would include detailed information about the level of 
education (undergraduate degree, MBA, Ph.D., etc.), the main subject studied (expertise) and the academic 
institutions that awarded the degree for each director (King, Srivastav, & Williams, 2016; Lester, Certo, Dalton, 
Dalton, & Cannella, 2006). Unfortunately, this information is not always available, particularly for cooperative 
banks, as cooperative banks are smaller and much more opaque (San-Jose, Retolaza, & Gutierrez-Goiria, 2011). 
Following Audretsch & Lehmann (2005), Colombelli (2015) and Wincent, Anokhin, & Örtqvist (2010), we 
proxy for the education of bank i’s board in period t by calculating the proportion of directors with at least a 
university degree. We have little or no information on post-graduate education (e.g., PhD, MBA or equivalent 
degrees). However, our proxy should be able to capture the biggest differences in the board’s education level 
between the two types of banks, given the substantially weaker mechanism of director selection adopted in 
cooperative banks (Alexopoulos et al., 2013; Schwizer & Stefanelli, 2011; Shaw, 2006).
Executive committee. Board effectiveness is a function not only of its composition (gender diversity, 
outside/inside directors, etc.) but also of its structure, e.g., the presence of board committees (Biao, N. Davidson, 
& J. DaDalt, 2003; Kesner, 1988; Klein, 1998). Therefore, we control for the presence of board committees. 
However, information on board committees for our sample is limited. We found information only on the 
existence of an executive committee. Therefore, we add a dummy variable equal to 1 if bank i in period t 
established an executive committee and 0 otherwise.
Independent directors. The literature suggests the beneficial effect of independent directors on effective 
corporate governance, but the findings in this instance are not conclusive (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Bhagat & 
Black, 2002; B. K. Boyd, 1994; Fama, 1980). However, in our estimations, we omit this variable because it is 
not clearly identifiable in cooperative banks as board members are elected among the owners, who are also 
customers (depositors or debtors) of the bank. Consequently, it is questionable whether these directors are ever 
independent (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015; European Association of Co-operative Banks, 
2015).
Regional GDP growth. To account for varying economic conditions over time, we include the GDP growth 
rate calculated for each of the 20 Italian regions as an indicator of local economic conditions.
Year and regional fixed effects. We control for Italian macro-regions to limit spurious effects related to 
different contextual conditions (economic, social and institutional differences, among regions, etc.) that might 
affect bank governance variables (Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Boytsun, Deloof, & Matthyssens, 2011; 
Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009) as well as bank activity. To control for regional fixed effects, we create four 
dummy variables for Northeast Italy, Northwest Italy, Central Italy, and South Italy and the Islands. Northeast 
Italy is used as the baseline. Moreover, all models are estimated with year fixed effects to control for changes in 
macroeconomic conditions.
We highlight that based on the information collected from the annual yearbooks of the Italian Banking 
Association, the CEO is absent from cooperative banks and from the large majority of joint-stock banks in our 
sample (only 4 percent are listed). Therefore, we do not control for CEO characteristics (e.g., pay, tenure, age, 
gender, duality, etc.).
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4.4 Methodology
To test whether board turnover and board education serve as significant channels through which bank 
institutional setting affects bank risk (the dependent variable) (hypotheses 1 and 2), we perform a mediation 
analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) (Tab. 4). In general terms, a mediation model aims to explore the mechanism 
underlying an observed relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable via the inclusion 
of a third explanatory variable, the mediator variable (Baran & Forst, 2015; Lang, Lins, & Maffett, 2012; Lins, 
Volpin, & Wagner, 2013). This approach is performed in four steps. In the first step, we estimate the 
relationship between the independent variable (cooperative dummy) and bank risk. To test this relation, we 
estimate the following panel model:
[1]titkitj XeCooperativaBank ,,ti,ti,risk  
Bank risk is measured as the NPL ratio, the Z-index and the standard deviation of ROA, alternatively. On the 
right-hand side, aj and λt are the macro-region and year fixed effects, respectively; Xi,t is a set of time-varying 
bank-specific control variables; and Yk,t is a set of time-varying regional control variables (GDP growth rate). 
The dummy Cooperative is our variable of interest. We use a dynamic panel approach to estimate the model [1], 
including one lag of the dependent variable as a regressor to account for the dynamic nature of risk (Delis & 
Kouretas, 2011; Köhler, 2014). The GDP growth rate, year and regional fixed effects are also included.
Model [1] is estimated through a GMM estimator approach because of endogeneity issues in our model 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998). While our key independent variable – a proxy for the institutional setting – is treated 
as exogenous (Gorton & Schmid, 1999), we add the following endogenous control variables: i) the lagged 
dependent variable and ii) corporate governance variables at the board level. Given that our independent 
variable is time-invariant, we use the system GMM estimator, which allows us to use time-invariant variables as 
regressors. Specifically, we use the two-step system GMM because it provides efficient estimators (Bond, 
Hoeffler, & Temple, 2001). Moreover, the two-step GMM results in a robust Hansen J-test for over-
identification. We also use robust standard errors that lead to consistent results in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. To test the validity of our approach, we use the Hansen J-
statistic of over-identifying restrictions to test the instruments’ validity, namely, the lack of correlation between 
the instrumental variables and the error term. In addition, we test the presence of first- and second-order serial 
correlation. The absence of second-order serial correlation indicates that the model is correctly specified and 
therefore that the estimates are not inconsistent.
In the second step, we determine whether the independent variable (cooperative dummy) significantly affects 
the mediators (board turnover and education) by estimating the following panel models:
            [2]titi,itjti, XeCooperativaturnoverBoard , 
[3]titi,itjti, XeCooperativaeducationBoard , 
In equation [2], we control for bank size, bank age, business model and bank performance (measured as ROE). 
Moreover, we include a dummy variable for listed banks (Liu, Wang, Zhao, & Ahlstrom, 2013), and we account 
for year and regional fixed effects. In equation [3], we use the previous control variables, and we add board size. 
We estimate models [2] and [3] using an instrumental variable (IV) approach to control for simultaneity bias 
between the dependent variable and bank performance. We instrument bank performance with its own first and 
second lags.
In the third step, we test the relationship between the mediators (board turnover and board education) and bank 
risk by estimating the following model:
  [4]titkti,tititjti, XturnoverBoardeducationBoardariskBank ,,,2,1  
Finally, we combine the first and the third steps and test whether the dummy for cooperative banks affects the 
dependent variable through board turnover and board education. Specifically, we estimate model [1] by adding 
board turnover and education as control variables. The existence of a mediation effect cannot be rejected if the 
mediators reduce the magnitude of the coefficient of our variable of interest, Cooperative dummy, and the 
mediators (board turnover and education) should be significant. We use Sobel’s test to assess the significance of 
the reduction or mediation effect (Sobel, 1982). This approach tests whether the indirect effect of the 
independent variable (cooperative dummy) on the dependent variable (bank risk) via the mediators (board 
turnover and education) is significantly different from zero.
Page 9 of 29 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
10
Finally, we highlight that to mitigate the impact of outliers, all variables with extreme values are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels.
4.5 Summary statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our main variables. Table 3 shows the mean comparison between joint-
stock and cooperative banks. Finally, Table 4 presents the correlation matrix.
Insert Table 2 about here
As shown in Table 2, most Italian banks have a strong focus on traditional and core activities, as 66% of their 
assets consist of customer loans, and their asset growth is approximately 9%, with an average profitability of 
4.8%. Bank boards typically consist of 10 members, of which only 4.7% are female directors. As for our key 
variables at the banking system level, board turnover is 12.5% and 39.4% directors have a university degree or 
higher. Table 3 indicates that low board education in the Italian banking industry derives from cooperative 
banks, in which approximately 23% directors have a university degree or higher, in contrast to 77% for joint-
stock banks.
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 shows that there are significant differences between joint-stock and cooperative banks with regard to 
bank structure and board characteristics. Compared to joint-stock banks, cooperative banks are smaller (t = 
40.396, p < 0.1%) and older (t = – 26.255, p < 0.1%), and their business models are based primarily on loan 
activities (t = – 3.593, p < 0.1%). Compared to the boards of joint-stock banks, the boards of directors of 
cooperative banks are smaller (t = 13.811, p < 0.1%) and have more women (t = – 7.642, p < 0.1%). In addition, 
in cooperative banks, both board turnover (t = 11.78, p < 0.1%) and board education (t = 77.251, p < 0.1%) are 
significantly lower than in joint-stock banks.
Finally, joint-stock and cooperative banks differ significantly in terms of their risk levels. We highlight that 
while cooperative banks have a higher Z-index (t = – 9.769, p < 0.1%) and a lower standard deviation of ROA (t 
= 4.754, p < 0.1%) than joint-stock banks, they take higher credit risk (t = – 13.884, p < 0.1%).
Table 4 shows that the correlation coefficients between our main variables are quite low, and we can thus 
assume that the multicollinearity problems in our models are modest. In particular, we note that both board 
turnover and board education are significantly associated with bank risk level. Board turnover is negatively 
associated with bank risk, and hence an increase in director turnover leads to low bank stability as measured by 
the Z-index (ρ = – 0.12, p < 0.1%), high profit volatility as measured by σ(ROA) (ρ = 0.091, p < 0.1%), and 
high credit risk as measured by NPL/Gross Loans (ρ = 0.04, p < 5%). Meanwhile, board education is negatively 
associated with bank risk as measured by the Z-index (ρ = – 0.222, p < 0.1%) and positively associated with 
profit volatility (ρ = 0.146, p < 0.1%). Therefore, an increase in directors’ education leads to low bank solidity 
and high profit volatility. However, board education is negatively associated with credit risk. Thus, an increase 
in board education leads to low credit risk (ρ = – 0.167, p < 0.1%).
Insert Table 4 about here
5. Results
In Table 5, we present the results of our mediation analyses. We measure bank risk with the Z-index, σ(ROA) 
and the NPL/Gross Loans ratio. 
All models are significant, and the Hansen’s J test statistic of over-identifying restrictions and the serial-
correlation tests do not reject the null hypothesis of correct specification. Therefore, the models are well-fitted 
and do not suffer from serial correlation problems and the instruments are exogenous. Although the models 
indicate the presence of first-order autocorrelation (Π1), since Π1 is statistically significant, our results are not 
inconsistent because this issue arises if a significant second order autocorrelation (Π2) emerges (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). Moreover, as suggested by Roodman (2009), we report the number of instruments used in the 
estimation, which is lower than the number of the panel group (610). Therefore, the Hansen J-statistic is more 
reliable. Finally, we note that in all the estimated models, the control variables have the expected signs and the 
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lagged dependent variables are also significant, indicating that bank risk is persistent. In particular, when the 
lagged dependent coefficient is significant and between 0 and 1, it suggests that risk persists but will eventually 
return to its average level.
To test the mediating effects of board education and turnover (hypotheses 1 and 2) on the relationship between 
cooperative status and bank risk, we follow the approach developed by Baron and Kenny (1986). Accordingly, 
Table 5 presents i) in column (1) the results of model [2] (using clustered robust standard errors) testing the 
relationship between our main independent variable (cooperative dummy) and board turnover and ii) in column 
(2) the results of model [3] (using clustered robust standard errors) that test the relationship between cooperative 
dummy and board education. Results indicate that the dummy for cooperative bank status has a highly 
significant and negative effect on board turnover (β = – 0.052, p < 0.1%) and on board education (β = – 0.447, p 
< 0.1%). Thus, there is significant evidence that board turnover and education are significantly lower in 
cooperative banks than in joint-stock banks. Moreover, we find a significant association between the 
independent variable and bank risk (model [1]). In column (3), we note a positive association between the 
cooperative dummy and the Z-index (β = 1.46, p < 1%). In column (7), we note a negative association between 
the cooperative dummy and profit volatility, σ(ROA) (β = – 1.39, p < 1%). Therefore, coherently with extant 
literature we conclude that cooperative banks are more stable and have less volatile profitability than joint-stock 
banks. Surprisingly, column (11) reports no association between the cooperative dummy and the NPL/Gross 
Loans ratio, our proxy for credit risk-taking (see later in section 4.1 for further investigation). 
Insert Table 5 about here
We also estimate the relationship between the mediators and the dependent variable (model [4]). When bank 
risk is measured as Z-index, in column (4), we note that the first mediator variable (board turnover) does not 
affect bank risk (β = 1.00, p >10%), while the second mediator, board education, has a highly significant and 
negative effect on bank risk (β = – 1.77, p < 5%). Moreover, we perform the last step of the mediation analysis, 
thus we add one at time board turnover and board education to model [1]. When board turnover is added to the 
model (column 5), the latter remains insignificant (β = 1.52, p > 10%) and the coefficient of the cooperative 
dummy remain significant but it decreases its effect from 1.46 (in column 3) to 1.08 (column 5). Overall, we 
thus find that board turnover does not mediate the relationship between the institutional setting of a bank and 
bank risk. Finally, in column (6), we show that the coefficient of the cooperative dummy variable is reduced in 
its effect and significance (β = 0.0826, p > 10%) when board education is added to the model, while board 
education remains significant (β = – 1.95, p < 1%). Thus, our evidence confirms that board education mediates 
the relationship between the cooperative status of a bank and bank risk, as measured by the Z-index. The 
Sobel’s test is statistically significant suggesting that board education indeed serves as a channel through which 
bank institutional setting affects bank risk (t = 3.36, p < 0.1%). 
We obtain similar results when bank risk is measured as profit volatility, i.e., σ(ROA). In column (7), we show 
that our independent variable has a highly significant and negative impact on bank risk, suggesting that 
cooperative banks are significantly less risky than joint-stock banks. In column (8), we show that although board 
turnover does not affect the σ(ROA) (β = – 0.30, p > 10%), board education has a highly significant and positive 
effect on bank risk (β = 1.93, p < 5%). Therefore, we can conclude that board turnover does not mediate the 
relationship between cooperative status and bank risk-taking. In fact, in column (9) we observe that when board 
turnover is added to the model with the independent variable (cooperative dummy), it remains insignificant (β = 
– 0.63, p > 10%) and the coefficient of the cooperative dummy increases from – 1.39 (in column 7) to – 1.066 
(column 9). Again, we conclude that board turnover does not mediate the relationship between the cooperative 
status of a bank and bank risk. Finally, in column (10), we show that when board education is added to the full 
model, the coefficient of the cooperative-status dummy variable is insignificant (β = – 0.22, p > 10%), and the 
mediator variable is positive and significant (β = 1.85, p < 5%). However, the coefficient of the cooperative-
status dummy variable is reduced from – 1.06 (in column 9) to – 0.22 (column 10), and the significance level of 
the coefficient is also reduced. Thus, we can conclude that board education partially mediates the relationship 
between bank cooperative status and bank risk, as measured by profit volatility. Also in this case the Sobel’s test 
is significant (t = – 3.35, p < 0.1%)
Surprisingly, when credit risk is used as the dependent variable, the results do not support any mediation effect 
of board turnover and board education on the relationship between cooperative bank status and bank risk-taking. 
We note in columns 11 to 14 that the coefficients of our independent variable (Cooperative) and of the two 
mediators are all not significant, which suggests that the cooperative status of a bank has no impact on credit 
risk-taking, which is also the case when we consider the mediating role of board characteristics in terms of 
turnover and education. Overall, we conclude that our argument is partially supported by empirical evidence. In 
other words, we reject hypothesis 2 on the mediating effects of board turnover. By contrast, we do not reject 
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hypothesis 1 on the mediating effects of board education only when bank risk is measured as Z-index and 
σ(ROA).
5.1 Further investigation of credit risk
Given the inconclusive results on credit risk, we further extend our investigation in two directions. First, we try 
a different model specification by testing a moderating rather than a mediating hypothesis regarding board 
education and turnover on the relationship between bank institutional setting and credit risk. This test was not 
supported (not tabulated). Second, we exploit bank characteristics that play a key role in explaining credit risk. 
We focus on bank size as a proxy for relationship-oriented banking activity and on bank age as a proxy for bank 
experience in credit management (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, & Stein, 2005; Cole, Goldberg, & White, 
2004; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000). We expect that small cooperative banks operating in localized areas have a 
closer relationship with their customers, such that the peer monitoring mechanisms are more effective and they 
therefore more heavily base their decisions on soft information. In contrast, larger cooperatives operating in 
larger areas will have more distant relationships with customers and are relatively more transaction-oriented, 
such that they resemble joint-stock banks. In addition, in larger geographical areas, peer monitoring mechanisms 
are less effective because the relationships between the bank and its customers and among customers are less 
stable. As a result, it can be assumed that small cooperative banks may have lower credit risk than larger 
cooperatives. With reference to bank age, we suggest that older banks have a greater opportunity to build their 
experience in credit management than younger banks, which should lead these older banks to have a better 
understanding of credit management policies at different levels of the credit process (from loan officers to CFOs 
and across credit cycles). Therefore, it can be expected that older cooperatives will have lower credit risk than 
younger cooperatives because they can better leverage their experience and their internal well of established 
procedures to conduct better evaluations of borrowers. Based on these considerations, we explore whether there 
is a moderating effect of bank size and age on the relationship between the cooperative status of a bank and 
credit risk. Specifically, we test both the two-way and the three-way interactions. In the first case, we added the 
interaction terms between the cooperative dummy variable and bank size and age (Cooperative × Bank size and 
Cooperative × Bank age) to the model in column 14 of Table 5. Subsequently, to test whether there is a three-
way interaction, we include the last lower order term, i.e., the interaction between bank size and age and the 
three-way term, i.e., the interaction between Cooperative dummy, bank size and bank age. The results of these 
estimations support the existence of neither a three-way interaction between Cooperative dummy, bank age and 
bank size nor a two-way interaction between cooperative dummy and bank age (not tabulated), but they do point 
to the existence of a significant interaction between cooperative status and bank size. In Table 5, column (15), 
we tabulate only this last result. We find that Cooperative dummy (β = -0.66, p < 5%) is negatively associated 
with bank risk and that the interaction term (Cooperative × Bank size) is positively associated with bank risk (β 
= 0.03, p < 5%). In Figure 2, for small and large bank sizes, we plot the bank risk for joint-stock banks and for 
cooperative banks. Small size and large size are calculated as average bank size minus/plus a standard deviation, 
respectively.
Insert Figure 2 about here
We highlight that the difference in the simple slope for small banks and large banks is significantly different 
from zero (β = -0.1004, p < 5%; β = 0.0712, p < 5%, respectively). Consequently, credit risk is significantly 
moderated by bank size. While small cooperative banks take less risk than their joint-stock bank counterparts, 
large cooperatives take more risk than large joint-stock banks. Moreover, we note that the difference in credit 
risk between cooperative and joint-stock banks is much higher for small banks than for large banks. Finally, we 
note that small cooperative banks have lower credit risk than large ones (β = -0.029, p < 0.1%). On the contrary, 
small joint-stock banks have higher credit risk than large ones (β = 0.022, p < 5%) but with a lower level of 
significance compared to cooperatives. This finding seems consistent with the view that small cooperative banks 
operating in localized areas have a closer relationship with their customers such that soft information about the 
borrowers and the peer monitoring mechanisms are more effective in guiding risk-taking decisions than the 
directors’ education level.
5.2 Robustness checks
We re-estimate models presented in Table 5 using a simple pooled OLS model replacing the contemporaneous 
board variables with their lag values. The interpretation of the results remains the same as that reported in Table 
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5 and hence is unreported. Additionally, Sobel’s test calculated on these new estimates leads to the same 
conclusions as found previously.
Given the cooperative bank characteristics, a further robustness test is necessary to control for the possibility 
that the bank risk-taking we analyze is not directly related to board education but to the cooperative model itself. 
In other words, we must control for the possibility that cooperatives simply take less risk structurally than joint-
stock banks because of their inherent business characteristics, despite their board members’ education. To 
control for this possibility, we estimate our models only for the cooperative sub-sample. We should expect that 
board education is not significant if cooperative banks’ risk-taking is driven mainly by their intrinsic 
characteristics. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. The models in Table 6 are significant and correctly 
specified.
Insert Table 6 about here
In line with our previous results, the results in Table 6 show that the board education variable is significant only 
when the bank risk is measured through the Z-index and σ(ROA), while it is not significant when the dependent 
variable is the credit risk. In column 1, we note that the coefficient of board education is significant and 
negatively associated with bank stability (β = -2.931, p < 0.1%). In column 2, the coefficient of board education 
is significant and positively associated with profit volatility (β = 2.101, p < 1%). Therefore, we conclude that in 
cooperative banks, stability and profit volatility are significantly associated with board education. Specifically, 
an increase in board education leads to higher cooperative bank risk-taking in terms of both lower bank stability 
and higher profit volatility. Overall, this result suggests that an increase in board education likely leads 
cooperative banks to engage in more risk-taking behavior.
This finding led us to conclude that board education drives our previous results, not the potential structural 
differences between the two institutional settings. In Table 7, we show the results obtained by including Italian 
Popular Banks in our sample.
Insert Table 7 about here
In Table 7, we highlight that the estimates are quite similar to previous results (Table 5).
Furthermore, we re-estimated our models by adopting the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA/TA) 
as an alternative measure of bank risk. Consistent with the evidence for our proxy of credit risk-taking, we find 
that the mediating role of board education on RWA exposure is weaker. This finding can be explained by the 
fact that on average, credit risk requirements are much higher than for any other risk considered in Pillar 1 
(market and operational risk).
Moreover, we re-estimated the previous models by excluding listed banks for two reasons. First, in Italy, listed 
banks are larger banks. Second, given that i) listed banks tend to be under stricter regulation and market 
discipline – which may “externally” require specific board characteristics (e.g., a higher education) – and ii) 
cooperative banks are not listed because their fundamental characteristics do not allow their shares to be traded, 
we decided to exclude listed banks to compare cooperative banks only with unlisted joint-stock banks, as neither 
are exposed to the disciplining power of the stock market. Therefore, by excluding listed banks, we have a more 
homogeneous sample. Unreported model estimations on the sample of unlisted banks confirm the previous 
results for all proxies of bank risk.
We also re-estimated the previous models to control for time-varying regional heterogeneity by including the 
interaction between year and regional fixed effects. The interaction between year and regional dummies captures 
relevant territorial dynamics not included in the control variables, such as changing conditions at the local level 
or shocks that may affect these areas differently, for instance, in terms of the local banking system and 
education levels. Additionally, in this case, the results are coherent with previous results.
All the tables related to the robustness tests that are not reported here are available upon request.
6. Discussion and conclusions
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Although bank governance is a subject of wide debate in the literature, to the authors’ knowledge, no empirical 
study to date has focused on the relationship between bank institutional setting (by distinguishing between 
cooperative and joint-stock banks) and risk-taking behavior by exploring the underlying board-level 
mechanisms (education and turnover). In this paper, we analyze how board characteristics in terms of education 
and turnover affect decision making about risk.
The distinction between cooperative and joint-stock banks is important not only to adequately assess the effect 
of board dynamics on risk-taking, given the different business models and objectives that these two types of 
banks entail, but also to clarify whether such differences are substantial enough to justify claims that they have 
different corporate governance standards. Furthermore, we highlight that unlike the current literature that uses 
listed companies to analyze the relationship between board education and risk-taking, we use a large dataset of 
mainly small and unlisted banks. Although this choice has not allowed us to have highly detailed variables, our 
study sheds new light on the governance of cooperative banks, which is a topic largely ignored by the empirical 
literature.
Our first result shows that cooperative banks take less risk than joint-stock banks, as suggested in the theoretical 
literature. Second, we show that these two types of banks are quite different in terms of their board 
characteristics, as cooperative banks have lower board turnover and educational levels than joint-stock banks; 
both board turnover and board education level are commonly considered to indicate weak governance. Our third 
result shows that cooperative banks’ lower risk-taking is driven by the lower educational level of the directors 
on the board. Notably, the result is not confirmed for credit risk-taking but only for measures of total risk. A 
comprehensive interpretation of these results leads to the conclusion that in cooperative banks, a lower level of 
education among board members leads to a lower exposure to total risk and, in turn, to more stable performance. 
Overall, our evidence supports the previous literature on board education and risk-taking and extends the 
research examining bank institutional settings and the role of specific aspects of board governance on bank risk-
taking. An interpretation consistent with our results is that in cooperative banks, less-educated directors may not 
undertake projects whose risks cannot be understood or even accessed (knowledge barrier) by management. By 
contrast, joint-stock banks, which are characterized by stronger incentives to maximize shareholder value and 
more educated boards, tend to undertake more of these sophisticated risks. Moreover, more educated directors 
could participate in more risk-taking activities due to their understanding of complex financial instruments 
(Minton et al., 2014). These explanations are relevant for policy makers because they are engaged in governance 
reforms of financial institutions. However, the competences and experience accumulated within the organization 
may be more relevant for credit risk than those of the board. Indeed, while we expect that the credit risk appetite 
is defined at the board level, the actual exposure to credit risk depends on the abilities to handle the relationships 
with customers/borrowers and/or to assess their creditworthiness, and in small cooperative banks, we expect that 
these abilities are more effective, given the closeness of the relationship with customers and the great deal of 
soft information. In fact, for banks that are more local and whose activity is based mainly on relationship 
lending, the influence of board education on risk-taking disappears, suggesting a prominent role of built-in 
experience, for instance, through the definition of internal credit policies to process soft and hard information, as 
a determinant of risk-taking. In addition, the analysis has revealed the relevance of the focus on institutional 
settings (cooperative as opposed to joint-stock status) for corporate governance standards.
This study has several implications. The recent global financial crisis has renewed the debate on bank risk-
taking and on how to improve corporate governance in banking (Laeven and Levine, 2009). In particular, a 
stronger role of the board of directors has been discussed as a potential mechanism to prevent excessive risk-
taking. Overall, our empirical evidence offers useful insights for the debate on improving corporate governance 
in banking while taking into account different institutional settings, contributing to the post-crisis industry and 
policy debate on this topic. The relevance of this debate lies in the key role of the banking industry in economic 
growth and financial stability, especially in countries such as Italy, where banks represent the main type of 
external financing for large firms and small and medium enterprises and where cooperative banks are often the 
only banks operating in more rural areas. From a policy perspective, the proposal of different standards for 
cooperative banks based on their “better” governance should consider the diversity of the cooperative banking 
system, such that large cooperative banks may eventually lose their focus on relationships with customers and 
engage in new activities and businesses that make them resemble – and even make them riskier than – joint-
stock banks from a risk-taking perspective.
Finally, we are aware that our proxy for board education is not perfect, but we believe that it supports the 
investigation of the role of education as a proxy for knowledge base and behavioral style. Although a rapidly 
growing literature emphasizes that while the impact of education on firm performance is not homogenous, it 
varies with degree type (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Berger et al., 2014; King et al., 2016) and that ‘elite’ 
education matters, we believe that our proxy for board education is relevant to assess the impact of education 
per se rather than qualifications. We cannot observe qualification levels or types of education, but had these 
been more important, we would have found insignificant results for our variable. In contrast, the board 
education variable is significant in our models, and our results are robust to several specifications.
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ENDNOTES
1 The Supervisory Authority (in Italy the Bank of Italy) has the power to replace the board of directors when the 
bank is under special measures. In this case, the Authority will call two “extraordinary administrators” to 
manage the bank and set up an audit committee to supervise them. Therefore, the owners of the bank have no 
longer control over the bank as long as the “extraordinary administration” process is completed. Only then, the 
owners will elect a new board of directors. Moreover, the bank balance sheet will report aggregate financial 
information for the entire period of the “extraordinary administration” (usually, about 2 years). This means that 
we cannot rely on balance sheet information after the bank enters the extraordinary administration.
REFERENCES
Alexopoulos, Y., Catturani, I., & Goglio, S. (2013). Searching for a model of governance in cooperative 
banking. In D. Brazda, J., Dellinger, M., Rößl (Ed.), Bestandsaufnahme und Ausgangssituation (pp. 707–
731). Wien: Lit Verlag.
Allemand, I., Brullebaut, B., & Raimbault, S. (2013). Exploring the Role of the Board of Directors in 
Cooperatives: Lessons for Microfinance. Strategic Change, 22(1–2), 79–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.1923
Anderson, R. C., & Fraser, D. R. (2000). Corporate control, bank risk taking, and the health of the banking 
industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24(8), 1383–1398. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(99)00088-6
Andres, P. De, & Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(12), 2570–2580. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.008
Audretsch, D. B., & Lehmann, E. E. (2005). The Effects of Experience, Ownership, and Knowledge on IPO 
Survival: Empirical Evidence from Germany. Review of Accounting and Finance, 4(4), 13–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/eb043435
Bank of Italy. 2018. Statistical Database, https://infostat.bancaditalia. it/giava-inquiry-
public/flex/Giava/GIAVAFEInquiry.html#, accessed on 05/10/2018.
Bantel, K. A., & Jackson, S. E. (1989). Top management and innovations in banking: Does the composition of 
the top team make a difference? Strategic Management Journal, 10, 107–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250100709
Baran, L., & Forst, A. (2015). Disproportionate insider control and board of director characteristics. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 35, 62–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.08.006
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological 
Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 51(6), 1173–1182. https://doi.org/10.1093/alcalc/34.2.197
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2015). Guidelines on Corporate governance principles for banks. 
Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf
Battistin, E., Graziano, C., & Parigi, B. M. (2012). Connections and performance in bankers’ turnover. 
European Economic Review, 56(3), 470–487. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.11.006
Beber, A., & Fabbri, D. (2012). Who times the foreign exchange market? Corporate speculation and CEO 
characteristics. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(5), 1065–1087. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.07.004
Becchetti, L., Garcia, M. M., & Trovato, G. (2011). Credit Rationing and Credit View: Empirical Evidence from 
an Ethical Bank in Italy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43(6), 1217–1245. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00423.x
Beck, T., Behr, P., & Guettler, A. (2013). Gender and banking: Are women better loan officers? Review of 
Finance, 17(4), 1279–1321. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs028
Beck, T., De Jonghe, O., & Schepens, G. (2013). Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(2), 218–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001
Beck, T., Hesse, H., Kick, T., & von Westernhagen, N. (2009). Bank Ownership and Stability: Evidence from 
Germany. Unpublished Working Paper (Washington, DC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), 
(April 2009), 1–61. Retrieved from 
https://fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2009/june/CFR_SS_2009_beck.pdf
Bellucci, A., Borisov, A., & Zazzaro, A. (2010). Does gender matter in bank-firm relationships? Evidence from 
small business lending. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(12), 2968–2984. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.07.008
Berger, A. N., Kick, T., & Schaeck, K. (2014). Executive board composition and bank risk taking. Journal of 
Page 15 of 29 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
16
Corporate Finance, 28, 48–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006
Berger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., & Stein, J. C. (2005). Does function follow 
organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 76(2), 237–269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.003
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial 
Preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043–1075. https://doi.org/10.1086/376950
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1169–1208. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303322552775
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long Term Firm 
Performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(2), 231–273. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.133808
Biao, X., N. Davidson, W., & J. DaDalt, P. (2003). Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: The 
Roles of the Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295-316., 9(404), 1–32.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. 
Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8
Bofondi, M., & Gobbi, G. (2006). Informational barriers to entry into credit markets. Review of Finance. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-006-6978-2
Bond, S. S., Hoeffler, A., & Temple, J. (2001). GMM estimation of empirical growth models. Economics 
Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College: University of Oxford, W21(01), 33. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00083-6
Borgen, S. O. (2004). Rethinking incentive problems in cooperative organizations. Journal of Socio-Economics, 
33(4), 383–393. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.04.010
Boubakri, N., Dionne, G., & Triki, T. (2008). Consolidation and value creation in the insurance industry: The 
role of governance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(1), 56–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.09.004
Boyd, B. K. (1994). Board Control and CEO Compensation. Strategic Management Journal, 15(5), 335–344. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250150502
Boyd, J. H., & De Nicoló, G. (2005). The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited. Journal of 
Finance, 60(3), 1329–1343. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00763.x
Boytsun, A., Deloof, M., & Matthyssens, P. (2011). Social Norms, Social Cohesion, and Corporate Governance. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(1), 41–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2010.00829.x
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental approach. American 
Economic Review, 89(1), 306–318. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.306
Chaddad, F. R., & Cook, M. L. (2004). Understanding new cooperative models: An ownership-control rights 
typology. Review of Agricultural Economics, 26(3), 348–360. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9353.2004.00184.x
Chaganti, R. S., Mahajan, V., & Sharma, S. (1985). Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures 
in Retailing Industry. Journal of Management Studies, 22(4), 400–417. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6486.1985.tb00005.x
Cole, R. A., Goldberg, L. G., & White, L. J. (2004). Cookie Cutter vs. Character: The Micro Structure of Small 
Business Lending by Large and Small Banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(02), 
227. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109000003057
Colombelli, A. (2015). Top management team characteristics and firm growth. Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Behavious and Research, 21(1), 107–127. https://doi.org/10.1108/ IJEBR-12-2013-0209
Cornforth, C. (2004). The Governance of cooperatives and mutual associations: A paradox perspective. Annals 
of Public and Cooperative Economics, 75(1), 11–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.2004.00241.x
Davis, P. (2001). The Governance of Co-operatives under Competitive Conditions: Issues, Processes and 
Culture. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000005975
De Nicoló, G., Jalal, A. M., & Boyd, J. H. (2006). Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory 
and New Evidence. IMF Working Papers, 06(297), 1. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865578.001
Delis, M. D., Hasan, I., & Tsionas, E. G. (2014). The risk of financial intermediaries. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 44(March), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.024
Delis, M. D., & Kouretas, G. P. (2011). Interest rates and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
35(4), 840–855. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.09.032
Delis, M. D., & Staikouras, P. (2009, August 17). On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical 
overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy. Retrieved from https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/16836/1/MPRA_paper_16836.pdf
Delis, M. D., & Staikouras, P. K. (2011). Supervisory effectiveness and bank risk. Review of Finance, 15, 511–
543. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfq035
Page 16 of 29Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
17
Dyck, A., Morse, A., & Zingales, L. (2010). Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud? Journal of Finance, 
65(6), 2213–2253. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x
Eldenburg, L., Hermalin, B. E., Weisbach, M. S., & Wosinska, M. (2004). Governance, performance objectives 
and organizational form: Evidence from hospitals. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(4), 527–548. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00031-2
European Association of Co-operative Banks. (2012). EACB Contribution to the Consultation by the High 
Level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU Banking Sector. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/banking_sector/registered-organisations/european-
association-cooperative-banks_en.pdf
European Association of Co-operative Banks. (2015). EACB Note on BCBS Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance Principles for Banks, 1–9. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalcube.net/clients/eacb/content/medias/publications/position_papers/Corporate_Governan
ce/150109_EACB_note_on_BCBS_review_of_Corporate_Governance_Principles_final.pdf
Fahlenbrach, R., & Stulz, R. M. (2011). Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 99(1), 11–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–
307. https://doi.org/10.2307/1837292
Fiordelisi, F., & Mare, D. S. (2013). Probability of default and efficiency in cooperative banking. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 26(1), 30–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2013.03.003
Fonteyne, W. (2007). Cooperative Banks in Europe— Policy Issues (Working Paper No. 07/159). Retrieved 
from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07159.pdf
Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. (2008). Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of directors 
as strategic decision making groups. In The Value Creating Board: Corporate Governance and 
Organizational Behaviour (pp. 190–217). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203888711
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2007). Corporate Leverage: How Much Do Managers Really Matter? SSRN 
Electronic Journal, 1–38. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.971082
Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Renneboog, L. (2001). Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing 
Companies? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10(3–4), 209–248. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/jfin.2001.0317
García-Marco, T., & Robles-Fernández, M. D. (2008). Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking 
industry: The Spanish evidence. Journal of Economics and Business, 60(4), 332–354. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.008
Giagnocavo, C., Gerez, S., & Sforzi, J. (2012). Cooperative bank strategies for social-economic problem 
solving: Supporting social enterprise and local dev lopment. Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 83(3), 281–315. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.2012.00464.x
Gorton, G., & Schmid, F. (1999). Corporate governance, ownership dispersion and efficiency: Empirical 
evidence from Austrian cooperative banking. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(2), 119–140. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(98)00019-4
Groeneveld, H., & de Vries, B. (2009). European co-operative banks : First lessons of the subprime crisis. The 
International Journal of Cooperative Management, 4(2), 8–21.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2009). Does local financial development matter? In The Banks and the 
Italian Economy (pp. 31–66). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2112-3_3
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top 
Managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 193–206. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1984.4277628
Hansmann, H. (2000). The ownership of enterprise. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Hardesty, S. D. (2005). Cooperatives as Marketers of Branded Products. Journal of Food Distribution Research, 
36(1), 237–242.
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008). A theory of board control and size. Review of Financial Studies, 21(4), 1797–
1832. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhl030
Harrison, J. R., Torres, D. L., & Kukalis, S. (1988). The changing of the guard: Turnover and structural change 
in the top-management positions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(2), 211–232. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2393056
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1998). Cooperatives vs. outside ownership. NBER Working paper (Vol. 6421). 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w6421
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards Of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A 
Survey of the Economic Literature. Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 7–26. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.233111
Herrmann, P., & Datta, D. K. (2005). Relationships between top management team characteristics and 
international diversification: An empirical investigation. British Journal of Management, 16(1), 69–78. 
Page 17 of 29 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
18
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00429.x
Hung, H. (1998). A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 6(2), 101–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00089
Jassaud, N. (2014). Reforming the Corporate Governance of Italian Banks (IMF Working Paper No. 
WP/14/181). Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42373.0
Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. (2011). Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1), 15–39. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-010-9228-2
Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.-L., & Saurina, J. (2014). Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do 
Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About The Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking? 
Econometrica, 82(2), 463–505. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10104
Kang, J. K., & Shivdasani, A. (1995). Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in 
Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 38(1), 29–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)00807-D
Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top executives, turnover, and firm performance in Germany. Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization, 10(1), 142–159. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/10.1.142
Keeling, J. J. (2004). Lessons in Cooperative Failure: The Rice Growers Association Experience. Agricultural 
Research in Economics, 7(3), 1–5.
Kesner, I. F. (1988). Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership: an Investigation of Type, 
Occupation, Tenure, and Gender. The Academy of Management Journal, 31(1), 66–84. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/256498
King, T., Srivastav, A., & Williams, J. (2016). What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank 
performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, 287–308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.003
Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board comittee structure. The Journal of Law & Economics, 41(1), 
275–304. https://doi.org/10.1086/467391
Köhler, M. (2014). Which banks are more risky? The impact of business models on bank stability. Journal of 
Financial Stability, 16, 195–212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.02.005
Konishi, M., & Yasuda, Y. (2004). Factors affecting bank risk taking: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Banking 
& Finance, 28(1), 215–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00405-3
Krivogorsky, V., & Eichenseher, J. W. (2005). Effects of Top Management Replacement on Firms’ Behavior: 
Empirical Analysis of Russian Companies. Management International Review, 45(4), 437–458. 
Kumar, P., & Zattoni, A. (2018). Corporate governance, boards of directors, and firm performance: Avenues for 
future research. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 26(6), 394–396. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12262
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2009). Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 
93(2), 259–275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.09.003
Lang, M., Lins, K. V., & Maffett, M. (2012). Transparency, Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence on 
When Transparency Matters Most. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(3), 729–774. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00442.x
Lester, R. H., Certo, S. T., Dalton, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Can ella, A. A. (2006). Initial public offering 
investor valuations: An examination of top management team prestige and environmental uncertainty. 
Journal of Small Business Management, 44(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-627X.2006.00151.x
Lins, K. V., Volpin, P., & Wagner, H. F. (2013). Does family control matter? International evidence from the 
2008-2009 financial crisis. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht044
Liu, Y., Wang, L. C., Zhao, L., & Ahlstrom, D. (2013). Board turnover in Taiwan’s public firms: An empirical 
study. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 30(4), 1059–1086. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-013-9363-
7
Mehran, H., Morrison, A., & Shapiro, J. (2012). Corporate Governance and Banks: What Have We Learned 
from the Financial Crisis? In M. Dewatripont & X. Freixas (Eds.), The Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory 
Paradigms (pp. 11–44). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Retrieved from 
http://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/Crisis_Aftermath.pdf
Miller, J. L. (2002). The board as a monitor of organizational activity: The applicability of agency theory to 
nonprofit boards. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 12, 429–450. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.12407
Minton, B. A., Taillard, J. P., & Williamson, R. (2014). Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and 
Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 
49(2), 351–380. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109014000283
Mizruchi, M. S., & Stearns, L. B. (1988). A Longitudinal Study of the Formation of Interlocking Directorates. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(2), 194–210. https://doi.org/Article
Nakano, M., & Nguyen, P. (2012). Board Size and Corporate Risk Taking: Further Evidence from Japan. 
Corporate Governance (Oxford), 20(4), 369–387. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2012.00924.x
Nicols, A. (1967). Property rights and behavior: Stock versus mutual Savings and Loan Associations: Some 
Page 18 of 29Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
19
evidence of differences in behavior. American Economic Review, 57(3), 337–346.
Palvia, A., Vähämaa, E., & Vähämaa, S. (2014). Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More Conservative and 
Risk Averse? Evidence from the Banking Industry During the Financial Crisis. Journal of Business Ethics, 
131(3), 577–594. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2288-3
Pathan, S. (2009). Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(7), 
1340–1350. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.001
Pevzner, M., Xie, F., & Xin, X. (2015). When firms talk, do investors listen? The role of trust in stock market 
reactions to corporate earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 190–223. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.004
Roodman, D. (2009). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. Stata 
Journal, 9(1), 86–136. https://doi.org/The Stata Journal
San-Jose, L., Retolaza, J. L., & Gutierrez-Goiria, J. (2011). Are Ethical Banks Different? A Comparative 
Analysis Using the Radical Affinity Index. Journal of Business Ethics, 100(1), 151–173. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0774-4
Saunders, A., Strock, E., & Travlos, N. G. (1990). Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking. 
The Journal of Finance, 45(2), 643–654. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03709.x
Schaeck, K., & Cihák, M. (2014). Competition, Efficiency, and Stability in Banking. Financial Management, 
43(1), 215–241. https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12010
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency Relationships in Family 
Firms: Theory and Evidence. Organization Science, 12(2), 99–116. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114
Schwizer, P., & Stefanelli, V. (2011). Governance e controlli interni. In A. Carretta (Ed.), Il credito cooperativo. 
Storia, diritto, economia, organizzazione (pp. 479–518). Bologna: Il Mulino.
Servin, R., Lensink, R., & van den Berg, M. (2012). Ownership and technical efficiency of microfinance 
institutions: Empirical evidence from Latin America. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(7), 2136–2144. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.03.018
Shaw, L. (2006). Overview of Corporate Governance Issues for Co-operatives. Global Corporate Governance 
Forum, (November 2006), 1–40.
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equation models. 
Sociological Methodology, 13(1982), 290–312. https://doi.org/10.2307/270723
Spear, R. (2004). Governance in Democratic Member-Based Organisations. Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 75(1), 33–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.2004.00242.x
Stefancic, M. (2014). Investigating Management Turnover in Italian Cooperative Banks. Journal of 
Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, 3(1), 131–163. https://doi.org/10.5947/jeod.2014.007
Tarantola, A. M. (2009). Le banche popolari cooperative: profili italiani ed europei. In Bank of Italy (Ed.). Bank 
of Italy. Retrieved from https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/interventi-direttorio/int-dir-
2009/Tarantola_270209.pdf
Vallascas, F., Mollah, S., & Keasey, K. (2017). Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks 
change after the global financial crisis? Journal of Corporate Finance, 44, 149–166. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.03.011
Vitaliano, P. (1983). Cooperative Enterprise: An Alternative Conceptual Basis for Analyzing a Complex 
Institution. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65(5), 1078. https://doi.org/10.2307/1240424
Wheelock, D., & Wilson, P. (2000). Why Do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and 
Acquisitions. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(1), 127–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003465300558560
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. a. (1992). Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change. 
Academy of Management Journal, 35(1), 91–121. https://doi.org/10.2307/256474
Wincent, J., Anokhin, S., & ??rtqvist, D. (2010). Does network board capital matter? A study of innovative 
performance in strategic SME networks. Journal of Business Research, 63(3), 265–275. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.03.012
Wincent, J., Anokhin, S., & Örtqvist, D. (2010). Does network board capital matter? A study of innovative 
performance in strategic SME networks. Journal of Business Research, 63(3), 265–275. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.03.012
Young, M. N., Buchholtz, A. K., & Ahlstrom, D. (2003). How Can Board Members Be Empowered If They Are 
Spread Too Thin? SAM Advanced Management Journal (07497075), 68(4), 4–11. 
Page 19 of 29 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
TABLE 1
Number of banks operating in Italy and their branches, classified by institutional setting
No % No of branches %
Joint-stock banks 147 27% 21,333 78%
Popular banks (Banche Popolari Cooperative) 23 4% 1,629 6%
Cooperative banks (Banche di credito cooperativo) 289 54% 4,257 16%
Foreign banks 79 15% 165 1%
Total 538 100% 27,374 100%
TABLE 2
Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Z-index 3489 284.42 68.12 1021.45 1.00 14378.83
σ(ROA) 3489 0.003 0.002 0.08 0 0.17
NPL/Gross Loans 3821 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.33
Bank size (€/billion) 4161 3,92 0.39 18,7 0.003214 431
Bank age (year) 4161 58.13 50 43.60 0.5 183
Business model 
(Loans/TA)
4161 0.66 0.70 0.18 0.07 0.99
Bank  growth rate 3494 0.09 0.07 0.17 -0.40 2.57
ROE 4160 0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.38 0.41
Board size 4161 9.74 9 2.83 5 24
Gender diversity 4161 0.05 0 0.07 0 0.44
Board turnover 4157 0.12 0 0.20 0 1.42
Board education 4131 0.39 0.33 0.33 0 1
Table 1 presents summary statistics for bank and board characteristics for our sample of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period. 
The Z-index measures bank stability. σ(ROA) is the ROA standard deviation. NPL/Gross Loans is the ratio of NPL to Gross Loans. 
Bank size denotes total bank assets. Bank age denotes the age of a bank. Business model is the ratio of loans to total assets as a 
proxy for the bank business model. Bank growth rate is the growth rate of assets. ROE is bank profitability. Board size is the number 
of board members. Gender diversity is the proportion of female members on the board. Board turnover is board member turnover. 
Board education is the proportion of directors with a university degree.
TABLE 3
Univariate tests of difference between joint-stock and cooperative banks
Variable Joint-stock Banks Cooperative Banks t-value
Z-index (ln) 3.96 4.49 -9.77***
σ(ROA) (ln) -6.41 -6.67 4.75***
NPL/Gross loans (ln) -2.82 -2.47 -13.88***
Bank size (ln) 21.46 19.32 40.40***
Bank age(ln) 2.97 3.90 -26.25***
Business model (Loans/TA) 0.64 0.67 -3.59***
Bank growth rate 0.11 0.08 2.95**
ROE (ln) 0.04 0.04 -0.61
Board size (ln) 2.33 2.19 13.81***
Gender diversity 0.03 0.05 -7.64***
Board turnover (ln) 0.15 0.08 11.78***
Board education 0.77 0.23 77.25***
No of obs. 1294 2867
Table 2 presents the univariate tests of difference between joint-stock and cooperative banks for different 
bank and board characteristics. Z-index is the natural logarithm of the Z-index. σ(ROA) is the natural 
logarithm of the ROA standard deviation. NPL/Gross Loans is the natural logarithm of the ratio of NPL 
to Gross Loans. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank age denotes the natural 
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logarithm of the age of a bank. Business model is the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank 
business model. Bank growth rate is the growth rate of assets. GDP is gross domestic product. ROE is the 
natural logarithm of bank profitability. Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board 
members. Gender diversity denotes the percentage of female members on the board. Board turnover is the 
natural logarithm of board member turnover. Board education is the percentage of directors holding a 
university degree. †, *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 4
Correlation matrix – Pearson coefficients
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Z-index (ln) 1
2. σ(ROA) (ln) -0.95*** 1
3. NPL/Gross Loans (ln) -0.08*** 0.08*** 1
4. Bank size (ln) -0.06** -0.09** -0.22** 1
5. Bank age (ln) 0.20*** -0.15*** 0.11*** -0.07*** 1
6. Business model 0.13*** -0.14*** 0.03† 0.15*** 0.16*** 1
7. Bank growth rate -0.09** 0.06*** -0.16*** -0.02 -0.23*** -0.18** 1
8. Regional GDP growth 0.17*** -0.16** -0.14*** -0.02 0.01 0.06** -0.06** 1
9. ROE (ln) 0.32*** -0.25*** -0.40*** 0.11*** 0.07*** -0.09*** 0.04* 0.13*** 1
10. Board size (ln) -0.03 -0.03† -0.09** 0.49*** -0.16*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.02 0.04** 1
11. Gender diversity -0.01 -0.0004 0.09*** -0.04** 0.08*** 0.04* -0.02 -0.06*** -0.06** 0.01 1
12. Board turnover (ln) -0.12*** 0.09*** 0.04* 0.10*** -0.18*** -0.06*** 0.03† -0.02 -0.11*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 1
13. Board education -0.22*** 0.15*** -0.17*** 0.50*** -0.38*** -0.20*** 0.07*** -0.04** -0.03* 0.19*** -0.05** 0.20*** 1
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between different bank and board characteristics. Z-index is the natural logarithm of the Z-index. σ(ROA) is the natural logarithm of the ROA standard deviation. 
NPL/Gross Loans is the natural logarithm of the ratio of NPL to Gross Loans. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank age denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a bank. Business 
model is the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model. Bank growth rate is the growth rate of assets. Regional GDP growth is gross domestic product growth rate at region level (20). 
ROE is the natural logarithm of bank profitability. Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity denotes the percentage of female members on the board. Board turnover 
is the natural logarithm of board member turnover. Board education is the percentage of directors holding a university degree. †, *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 5
Mediation analysis of board characteristics on the relationship between risk and bank institutional setting – GMM estimation
Dependent
Board
Turnover
Board
Education Z-index Z-index Z-index Z-index σ(ROA) σ(ROA) σ(ROA) σ(ROA) NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Lagged dependent 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94***
(3.34) (3.48) (3.56) (3.46) (3.09) (3.07) (2.94) (3.01) (17.45) (17.93) (18.15) (17.96) (18.16)
Bank size 0.002 0.03*** 0.69** 0.43* 0.45† 0.41 -0.70* -0.50* -0.51* -0.54* 0.001 -0.01 0.001 0.002 -0.01
(0.82) (5.79) (2.63) (2.10) (1.89) (1.49) (-2.49) (-2.51) (-2.41) (-2.19) (0.10) (-0.32) (0.09) (0.24) (-1.16)
Bank age -0.002 -0.02*** 0.021 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.003 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01† -0.01† -0.01†
(-0.85) (-4.24) (0.25) (1.05) (1.25) (0.92) (0.03) (-0.32) (-0.81) (-0.14) (-1.64) (-0.68) (-1.80) (-1.86) (-1.80)
Business model -0.03 -0.19*** 4.50** 0.71 1.98 0.38 -3.62* -0.31 -1.80 -0.50 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.19***
(-1.27) (-6.43) (2.60) (0.46) (1.30) (0.22) (-2.02) (-0.19) (-1.27) (-0.29) (3.82) (3.60) (4.16) (3.67) (3.37)
Bank growth rate 0.65† 0.14 0.28 0.057 -0.80* -0.37 -0.54† -0.38
(1.73) (0.44) (0.99) (0.19) (-2.02) (-1.06) (-1.78) (-1.14)
Listed bank 0.02 0.06* -0.01 -0.38 -0.11 -0.24 0.31 0.55 0.38 0.49† 0.002 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.71) (2.10) (-0.04) (-0.91) (-0.39) (-0.84) (0.83) (1.33) (1.29) (1.69) (0.06) (-0.18) (0.11) (0.26) (0.63)
M&A -0.42 -0.44† -0.28 -0.38† 0.52† 0.50* 0.38 0.50*
(-1.39) (-1.79) (-1.14) (-1.65) (1.79) (2.02) (1.59) (2.22)
Performance -0.26* -0.30**
(-2.59) (-3.10)
Abnormal NPL -0.66*** -0.69*** -0.74*** -0.68*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.60*** 0.56***
(-4.20) (-5.11) (-5.02) (-5.15) (3.91) (4.39) (4.40) (4.37)
Regional GDP growth 10.22*** 11.46*** 8.71** 11.10*** -8.50** -9.10*** -7.56** -9.05*** -1.04* -1.08* -1.02* -1.03* -0.94†
(3.34) (4.46) (3.21) (4.40) (-3.02) (-3.48) (-2.91) (-3.64) (-2.14) (-2.20) (-2.09) (-2.10) (-1.94)
Board size -0.04* -1.91 -0.82 -1.83† -0.88 1.48 0.69 1.25 0.82 0.05* 0.06† 0.05† 0.05† 0,05
(-2.26) (-1.43) (-0.84) (-1.69) (-0.83) (1.21) (0.72) (1.33) (0.82) (1.98) (1.74) (1.90) (1.73) (1.64)
Gender diversity 1.42 -0.70 -1.01 -0.83 -0.24 0.88 1.64 1.04 -0.41 -0.31 -0.40 -0.32 -0.35
(0.59) (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.43) (-0.10) (0.46) (0.80) (0.54) (-1.37) (-1.19) (-1.35) (-1.21) (-1.32)
Executive committee -0.16 0.031 0.14 0.08 0.17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.005 0.005 0.004 0.01 0.005 -0.001
(-0.56) (0.14) (0.60) (0.35) (0.69) (-0.05) (-0.10) (-0.02) (0.45) (0.32) (0.52) (0.45) (-0.05)
Independent
Cooperative -0.05*** -0.45*** 1.46** 1.08* 0.0826 -1.39** -1.06** -0.22 -0.0001 -0.004 -0.04 -0.66*
(-5.46) (-26.07) (2.98) (2.45) (0.13) (-2.69) (-2.63) (-0.36) (-0.00) (-0.17) (-0.45) (-2.35)
Cooperative×Bank size 0.03*
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(2.39)
Mediators
Board turnover 1.00 1.52 1.10 -0.30 -0.63 -0.35 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09
(0.69) (1.04) (0.75) (-0.20) (-0.42) (-0.24) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.59) (-0.54)
Board education -1.77* -1.95** 1.93* 1.85* 0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(-2.47) (-2.72) (2.39) (2.22) (0.40) (-0.38) (-0.39)
Constant 0.12† 0.38*** -9.99† -3.16 -3.67 -2.25 8.38 2.20 3.72 3.02 -0.41* -0.298 -0.38† -0.35† -0.035
(1.88) (3.88) (-1.85) (-0.78) (-0.74) (-0.41) (1.47) (0.56) (0.82) (0.60) (-1.98) (-0.97) (-1.91) (-1.73) (-0.12)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 2821 2811 2684 2679 2684 2679 2684 2679 2684 2679 3112 3104 3111 3104 3104
F/Wald χ2 11.41*** 287.07*** 256.5*** 361.8*** 315.5*** 374.2*** 292.7*** 347.6*** 337.2*** 352.3*** 4387.9*** 4076.0*** 4400.6*** 4291.4*** 4333.9***
Hansen J 1.699 1.129 14.81 30.29 29.12 30.50 16.88 29.10 28.82 29.16 28.77 33.75 28.98 32.91 32.65
Π1 -11.29*** -11.08*** -10.68*** -10.98*** -11.52*** -11.60*** -11.40*** -11.57*** -6.48*** -6.38*** -6.48*** -6.39*** -6.40***
Π2 0.59 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.55 0.32 0.31 0.337 -0.68 -0.69 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68
No of instruments 50 59 55 60 50 59 55 60 41 48 45 49 50
This table reports the regression (GMM estimator) results of the mediation effect of board turnover and board education on the relationship between cooperative banks and bank risk taking. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Bank age denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a bank. Business model is the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model. Bank growth rate is the growth rate of assets. Listed bank is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a bank is listed in a stock exchange market. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank acquires another bank in a given year. Abnormal NPL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the NPL/Gross Loans ratio of a 
bank is higher or lower than the 90th or 10th percentile, respectively. Regional GDP growth is gross domestic product growth rate at region level (20). Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity 
denotes the percentage of female members on the board. Executive Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive committee exists in a given bank. Cooperative dummy is equal to 1 if a bank is a cooperative and 0 otherwise. 
Board turnover is the natural logarithm of board member turnover. Board education is the percentage of directors holding a university degree. Year and location dummies control for year and location fixed effects. Z values are reported 
in parentheses. Standard errors are robust. †, *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6 
Regression results of bank risk measured through the Z-index, σ(ROA) and NPL/GROSS Loans for the sub-
sample of cooperative banks – GMM estimation
Dependent Z-index σ(ROA) NPL
1 2 3
Lagged dependent 0.0906* 0.0728† 0.938***
(2.20) (1.77) (11.84)
Bank size 0.202 -0.179 0.0354†
(0.77) (-0.72) (1.65)
Bank age 0.0453 -0.0496 -0.0147
(0.60) (-0.67) (-0.88)
Business model 1.199 -2.354† 0.259*
(0.91) (-1.91) (2.57)
Bank growth rate 0.0122 -0.482
(0.03) (-1.13)
Listed bank -0.0144 0.310 0.0123
(-0.04) (0.83) (0.26)
M&A -0.0556 0.151
(-0.21) (0.58)
Abnormal NPL -0.566*** 0.500***
(-3.69) (3.56)
Regional GDP growth 11.82*** -8.534** -0.361
(4.07) (-3.08) (-0.48)
Board size -1.114 0.692 0.0488
(-1.32) (0.85) (0.68)
Gender diversity -0.144 0.879 -0.798
(-0.08) (0.51) (-0.98)
Executive committee 0.252 -0.176 0.0115
(1.50) (-1.13) (0.52)
Board turnover 0.593 -0.478 0.568
(0.40) (-0.36) (0.87)
Board education -2.931*** 2.101** -0.698
(-3.58) (2.60) (-1.28)
Constant 2.003 -2.488 -1.013**
(0.58) (-0.77) (-2.58)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Location dummies yes yes yes
N 1943 1943 2286
Wald χ2 206.3*** 259.4*** 2097.6***
Hansen J 27.67 27.90 27.35
Π1 -9.477*** -9.528*** -6.583***
Π2 0.833 0.675 0.482
No of instruments 60 60 41
This table reports the regression (GMM estimator) results for cooperative 
sample only. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank 
age denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a bank. Business model is the 
ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model. Bank 
growth rate is the growth rate of assets. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a bank acquires another bank in a given year. Abnormal NPL is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the NPL/Gross Loans ratio of a bank is higher or lower 
than the 90th or 10th percentile, respectively. Regional GDP growth is gross 
domestic product growth rate at region level (20). Board size is the natural 
logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity denotes the 
percentage of female members on the board. Executive Committee is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if an executive committee exists in a given bank. 
Board turnover is the natural logarithm of board member turnover. Year and 
Regional dummies control for year and regional fixed effects. Z values are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust. †, *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 7
Mediation analysis of board characteristics on the relationship between risk and bank institutional setting – GMM estimation – Including Popular Banks
Dependent Boardturnover
Board
 education Z-index Z-index Z-index Z-index σ(ROA) σ(ROA) σ(ROA) σ(ROA) NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Lagged dependent 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93***
(3.58) (3.62) (3.70) (3.62)   (3.32) (3.13) (3.15) (3.13)   (16.60) (17.06) (17.37) (17.27) (17.54)
Bank size 0.003 0.03*** 0.78** 0.44* 0.46† 0.32 -0.78* -0.50** -0.51* -0.45   -0.003 -0.01 -0.003 -0.002 -0.02
(0.96) (6.22) (2.75) (2.12) (1.77) (1.04)   (-2.51) (-2.58) (-2.16) (-1.62)   (-0.39) (-0.59) (-0.43) (-0.23) (-1.40)
Bank age -0.003 -0.03*** -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.002   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01† -0.01† -0.01†
(-1.21) (-4.82) (-0.18) (0.69) (0.73) (0.69)   (0.46) (-0.20) (-0.27) (-0.03)   (-1.53) (-0.56) (-1.73) (-1.76) (-1.72)
Business model -0.04 -0.19*** 5.09* 0.45 2.07 -0.47   -4.03† 0.05 -1.71 0.47 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.19**
(-1.47) (-6.88) (2.47) (0.27) (1.27) (-0.25)   (-1.82) (0.03) (-1.07) (0.25)   (3.66) (3.38) (4.02) (3.52) (3.23)
Bank growth rate 0.72† 0.09 0.30 -0.08   -0.82† -0.30 -0.50 -0.21   
(1.83) (0.27) (1.03) (-0.25)   (-1.95) (-0.84) (-1.64) (-0.61)   
Listed bank 0.02 0.05* -0.31 -0.53 -0.27 -0.41   0.56 0.75† 0.52 0.66*  -0.001 -0.02 0.002 0.005 0.02
(0.89) (2.28) (-0.80) (-1.30) (-0.98) (-1.39)   (1.34) (1.74) (1.62) (2.09)   (-0.03) (-0.33) (0.04) (0.11) (0.43)
M&A -0.51 -0.38 -0.20 -0.28   0.55† 0.44† 0.28 0.38
(-1.52) (-1.50) (-0.82) (-1.19)   (1.65) (1.71) (1.11) (1.61)
Performance -0.27** -0.29**
(-2.72) (-3.09)
Abnormal NPL -0.63*** -0.68*** -0.71*** -0.68*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.56***
(-3.93) (-5.21) (-4.99) (-5.37)   (3.59) (4.47) (4.32) (4.49)   
Regional GDP growth 8.67** 9.66*** 6.78** 9.23*** -7.00* -7.58** -5.55* -7.26** -0.93† -0.99* -0.92† -0.96* -0.88†
(2.91) (3.76) (2.70) (3.73)   (-2.45) (-2.89) (-2.21) (-2.96)   (-1.91) (-2.02) (-1.90) (-1.97) (-1.82)
Board size -0.04* -2.47* -1.35 -2.46* -1.16 1.99† 1.08 1.90* 1.05 0.06* 0.08† 0.06* 0.06* 0.06†
(-2.28) (-2.09) (-1.34) (-2.25) (-0.93)   (1.80) (1.12) (1.99) (0.94)   (2.20) (1.94) (2.14) (2.01) (1.95)
Gender diversity 1.69 -0.61 -0.50 -0.60   -0.55 0.60 0.91 0.59 -0.45 -0.34 -0.44 -0.34 -0.37
(0.69) (-0.31) (-0.22) (-0.31)   (-0.23) (0.32) (0.42) (0.30)   (-1.48) (-1.25) (-1.47) (-1.30) (-1.40)
Exec. commit. -0.12 0.15 0.26 0.23 0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.16   0.01 0.004 0.01 0.005 -0.001
(-0.41) (0.65) (1.13) (1.05)   (0.46) (-0.50) (-0.69) (-0.76)   (0.48) (0.29) (0.53) (0.40) (-0.08)
Popular bank -0.06*** -0.06* 0.70* 0.50 0.74*** 0.56*  -0.57* -0.40 -0.58** -0.46†  -7.56 -7.79 -8.84 -7.88 -8.46
(-5.26) (-2.39) (2.29) (1.30) (3.32) (2.20)   (-2.05) (-1.06) (-2.80) (-1.87)   (-0.76) (-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.84)
Independent
Cooperative -0.05*** -0.44*** 1.58** 0.97* -0.25   -1.49* -0.94* 0.08 -0.002 -0.01 -0.02 -0.61*
(-5.50) (-26.81) (2.83) (2.01) (-0.34)   (-2.47) (-2.04) (0.12)   (-0.08) (-0.28) (-0.31) (-2.13)
Cooperative×Bank size 0.03*
(2.19)
Mediators
Board turnover 0.59 0.69 0.67 0.27 0.22 0.20 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12
(0.45) (0.50) (0.51)   (0.20) (0.16) (0.15) (-0.64) (-0.66) (-0.74) (-0.69)
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Board education -1.78* -2.13** 1.76* 1.97* 0.10 -0.03 -0.04
(-2.29) (-2.88)   (2.22) (2.28) (0.54) (-0.20) (-0.20)
Constant 0.12* 0.38*** -10.98† -1.92 -2.27 1.01 9.09 1.12 2.12 -0.25 -0.39† -0.23 -0.36† -0.34† -0.03
(2.00) (4.13) (-1.71) (-0.46) (-0.44) (0.17)   (1.32) (0.28) (0.42) (-0.04) (-1.91) (-0.74) (-1.79) (-1.66) (-0.12)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 2973 2963 2822 2817 2822 2817 2822 2817 2822 2817 3112 3104 3111 3104 3104
Wald χ2 10.81*** 302.50*** 258.80*** 375.70*** 331.60*** 383.50*** 281.40*** 363.40*** 342.10*** 363.20*** 3987.5*** 3620.8*** 3983.1*** 3939.9*** 4016.8***
Hansen J 2.02 1.06 31.31 37.47 32.57 37.33 14.78 34.87 30.27 35.46 26.08 30.98 25.77 30.45 29.87
Π1 -11.77*** -11.75*** -11.76*** -11.65*** -11.95*** -12.06*** -12.08*** -12.10*** -6.51*** -6.40*** -6.52*** -6.43*** -6.45***
Π2 0.64 0.42 0.51 0.38 0.94 0.55 0.71 0.53 -0.67 -0.68 -0.67 -0.68 -0.68
No of instruments 51 60 56 61 51 60 56 61 42 49 46 50 51
This table reports the regression (2SLS-IV) results of the mediation effect of board turnover and board education on the relationship between cooperative banks and bank risk taking. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Bank age denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a bank. Business model is the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model. Bank growth rate is the growth rate of assets. Listed 
bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is listed in a stock exchange market. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank acquires another bank in a given year. Performance is expressed as the natural logarithm of 
bank profitability (ROE). Abnormal NPL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the NPL/Gross Loans ratio of a bank is higher or lower than the 90th or 10th percentile, respectively. Regional GDP growth is gross domestic 
product growth rate at region level (20). Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity denotes the percentage of female members on the board. Executive Committee is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if an executive committee exists in a given bank. Popular bank is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is a popular bank and 0 otherwise. Cooperative dummy is equal to 1 if a bank is a cooperative and 0 
otherwise. Board turnover is the natural logarithm of board member turnover. Board education is the percentage of directors holding a university degree. Year and location dummies control for year and location fixed effects. 
Z values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. †, *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1 
Conceptual model
FIGURE 2
Interaction effects of bank size on the relationship between bank institutional setting and credit risk
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